Japan’s Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), Public Security Bureau, First Foreign Affairs Division, announced on January 20 that it had referred for prosecution a former employee of Russia’s Trade Representation in Japan and a former employee of a machine tool manufacturer. They are suspected of violating Japan’s Unfair Competition Prevention Act. In other words, it can be said that the MPD has obtained facts that may serve as a starting point in uncovering suspected Russian intelligence activity.
Many readers may feel that espionage is something that has little to do with them. However, as the case involving the former employee of the machine tool manufacturer suggests, intelligence officers based in Japan may target technical information held by private companies. Readers and businesses considering entry into the Japanese market—especially those with technologies that provide a competitive advantage—are not necessarily exempt from becoming targets.
This article explores intelligence activities by foreign states in Japan that businesspeople working in the country should be aware of.
Historical Cases Suggest That Businesspeople in Japan May Become Targets of Espionage
As noted above, the term “espionage” may not feel particularly relevant to the average businessperson. But do cases actually exist in which companies operating in Japan—or their employees—are targeted by a foreign intelligence agency?
The answer is as follows: while there have been only a limited number of cases in which Japan’s police and other law enforcement authorities have taken action against foreign private individuals in Japan in similar circumstances, it is only natural to assume that foreign companies operating in Japan may also fall within the range of targets that intelligence agencies wish to approach. This may sound rather indirect, but the reasoning can be explained step by step.
First, why don’t Japanese law enforcement authorities apprehend foreign private individuals residing in Japan in espionage-related cases? One reason is that Japan’s legal framework for counterintelligence remains underdeveloped. In addition, there may be cases in which authorities refrain from making an incident public due to diplomatic considerations.
So far, this remains in the realm of inference. However, there is a historical fact that the Soviet Union conducted espionage activities against Germany while using Japan—a “third country”—as its operational stage. This suggests that companies operating in Japan can, in fact, become targets of espionage activity.
The most well-known example is the Sorge Incident.
In the early 1940s, Richard Sorge—a journalist who was, in reality, a Soviet intelligence officer—gathered information in Japan and concluded that although Japan was preparing for war against the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and the Netherlands, it had no immediate intention of going to war with the Soviet Union. From the Soviet perspective, the information brought by Sorge allowed it to concentrate its forces on the German-Soviet War.
Ultimately, Sorge’s espionage activities were exposed by the Japanese authorities, and he was executed.
While Sorge conducted espionage involving Japanese individuals, he also had access to the German Embassy in Japan. Naturally, information obtained there was also transmitted to the Soviet Union.
These historical facts indicate that a “third country”—other than the country conducting the espionage and the country serving as the stage for it—can also become a potential target of intelligence operations.
In Sorge’s case, some may argue that he was able to move freely within the German Embassy because he was of German descent. However, in the incident referenced at the beginning of this article, the Russian intelligence operative reportedly told the employee of the manufacturer that he was “Ukrainian.”
For this reason, even non-Japanese individuals doing business in Japan should exercise a certain degree of caution regarding intelligence activity.
Countries Conducting Intelligence Activities in Japan
So which countries conduct intelligence activities in Japan? OHYASHIMA is a Japan-based media outlet that belongs to what was historically referred to as the Western bloc, and I myself am Japanese. With that in mind, I ask readers to understand that the following discussion is presented from Japan’s perspective.
Broadly speaking, the countries in question include:
- Russia
- China
- North Korea
- Others
By this point, readers may already have gained a partial understanding of Russia’s intelligence activities in Japan.
Some readers may also be aware that China conducts intelligence operations globally across borders. In particular, concerns and claims have been raised that Confucius Institutes may be linked to information-gathering activities, and so-called “overseas police stations” have also drawn attention. Regarding the former, it may be useful for companies operating in Japan—and their employees—to be aware of at least the basics.
Next, North Korea. While it is a fact that North Korea has carried out operations against Japan, including the abductions of Japanese citizens, there are only limited cases that have become public involving operations or information-gathering targeting foreign nationals or companies in Japan.
It is also impossible to rule out the possibility of becoming a target of intelligence activity by one’s home country or even an allied country. Not all such activity necessarily stems from hostile intent, but even allies may have incentives to obtain sensitive information. At the same time, government agencies may also be motivated to prevent such information from being leaked.
The Difficult but Necessary Practice of Praising Those Who Come Forward Honestly
There are several counterintelligence measures companies can take, such as employee training, building systems in which only personnel who truly need access can obtain sensitive information, and implementing regular job rotations.
Here, however, I would like to focus not on preventive measures, but on what to do if information leakage to an intelligence operative has already occurred.
As someone who works in the media, I gather information on a daily basis, and I have attended a lecture given by an investigator from Japan’s Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA). PSIA is Japan’s intelligence agency. I attended the lecture relatively recently, within the past one to two years.
In the lecture, the investigator spoke about how companies should respond if an employee admits that they have leaked information, saying the following:
“First, listen carefully to what the person has to say. And once you have finished listening, praise them for coming forward honestly. Doing so helps create an environment in which the organization can properly grasp the facts even when information leaks occur, which in turn contributes to preventing recurrence.”
From a management standpoint, it may feel difficult to praise an employee who has made a serious mistake. However, the person reporting the incident is also showing courage in coming forward. At the very least, that action should be recognized.
Such an approach may also help build psychological safety within the organization, potentially contributing to organizational vitality beyond information security alone.
